We examine a balanced panel of globalization indices for 129 countries over the years 1991-2010. We report evidence of cross-country sigma convergence in the overall globalization index. Sigma convergence also holds for each of the economic, political, and social globalization indices, as well as each sub-index within these indices. However, the evidence for stochastic convergence, based on panel unit root tests, is only strong for the political globalization index. Regarding the economic and social dimensions of globalization, respectively, we find evidence for stochastic convergence only in the flows and cultural proximity sub-indices. For the OECD subsample, evidence supports stochastic convergence for the overall, economic and political globalization indices. Evidence to support regional convergence among the non-OECD nations on various globalization dimensions is much more limited. Our findings indicate that globalization convergence is truly global only on the political dimension.
Introduction
An International Monetary Fund (IMF) website aptly describes globalization as "an extension beyond national borders of the same market forces that have operated for centuries at all levels of human economic activity". 1 Such market forces are increasingly evident in the flows of goods, people, and ideas across countries' borders. As a result, countries are generally more integrated; more globalized than ever before.
However, the pace of globalization has not been uniform across countries. As Frankel (2000) notes, the "two main drivers of economic globalization are reduced costs to transportation and communication in the private sector, and reduced policy barriers to trade and investment on the part of the public sector" (p. 2). The latter are constituted by legal institutions and can be extended to include barriers to migration and to the exchange of information. The evolution of these institutions in any individual country is a complex process and, undoubtedly, there are also interdependencies across the processes of different countries.
In this paper we investigate how truly global is globalization. Regarding the extent of integration, are all or most countries converging towards a common benchmark? Or is convergence only occurring within certain groups (or clubs) of countries, each with their own benchmark? Alternatively, have some countries simply stalled in the globalization process? Furthermore, do the answers to these questions differ depending on the particular dimension of globalization considered? We explore a panel of 129 countries covering the years 1991-2010 and seek to characterize countries' globalization processes by utilizing the KOF globalization indices values (Dreher, 2006) . These indices include an overall globalization index, but also constituent economic, social, and political indices; as well as sub-indices within the economic and social categories.
Our work is related to that of Arribas et al. (2009) . These authors propose a standard of perfect integration (SPII) that "characterizes a world where frontiers and distance do not matter" and "describes the conditions under which the world economy would operate as a global village" (p. 127) . They then analyze, using various measures of globalization, how close the world has approached the SPII. 2 The perspective on globalization explored here is different and complements that of Arribas et al. (2009) 
Rather than relative to an ideal, we simply seek evidence of benchmarks towards which countries may be actually converging. To the extent that the average KOF index values are increasing over time, this evidence meaningfully characterizes globalization processes.
We consider two related concepts of convergence: sigma convergence and stochastic convergence. The former is perhaps the most straightforward convergence concept. Based on some index of globalization, sigma convergence describes a situation where the dispersion of cross-country index values decreases over time. 3 Alternatively, stochastic convergence holds when shocks to a country's globalization index value relative to some benchmark (e.g., the world average) have only temporary effects. Thus, the ratio of a country's index relative to the benchmark is stationary. While sigma convergence is what matters in some ultimate sense, looking at cross-country coefficients of variation neglects the fact that variation over time can arise from temporary shocks. Failing to observe sigma convergence, a researcher may be overlooking important long-run tendencies towards convergence.
Alternatively, an observation of sigma convergence may be an artifact of a particular history of shocks rather than systematic forces tending towards long-run convergence. 4 2 They report: "The distance to the theoretical potential of trade integration is still considerable, since we have no reached the halfway point [yet] the ground covered over the last forty years is quite remarkable, as it represents advances in international integration of more than 75%" (Arribas et al., 2009, p. 142) . 3 The importance of sigma convergence in regards to per capita incomes is highlighted by Friedman (1992) and Quah (1993) . In particular, these authors contrast sigma convergence to the alternative concept of beta convergence that is the focus of numerous empirical studies of economic growth (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) , Mankiw et al. (1992) , Islam (1995) , Sala-i-Martin (1996) , Caselli et al. (1996) , Evans (1997) , and Higgins et al. (2006) ). Beta convergence occurs when the partial correlation between a variable's growth rate and its initial level is negative; likewise, in the context of empirical studies based on the neoclassical growth model, when an economy's income level grows faster, all else equal, the greater the distance between its initial level and its steady-state level. Importantly, because steady-states can differ across countries and random shocks can occur, beta convergence is not sufficient (though it is necessary) for sigma convergence (Young et al., 2008) . (The "beta" and "sigma" terminologies arise from the empirical growth literature and signify, respectively, the coefficient on initial per capita income in a growth regression and the standard notation for a standard deviation.) 4 Using U.S. state level data on per capita income from 1930 -2009 , Heckelman (2013 explores beta convergence, sigma convergence, and also stochastic convergence.
In a broad sense, the extent to which a country is globalized implies the quality of various institutions. Our study, then, is also related to a small number of existing studies on cross-country institutional convergence. Nieswiadomy and Strazicich (2004) Elert and Halvarsson (2012) also report evidence of cross-country beta convergence in the EFW index. Heckelman and Mazumder (2013) report that convergence in financial reforms since the 1970s has been largely a regional (rather than global) phenomenon.
We report evidence of global sigma-convergence for all KOF indices and sub-indices. However, strong support for stochastic convergence is only associated with the political dimension of globalization.
In an OECD subsample of countries we report evidence supporting stochastic convergence in the overall globalization index, as well as the economic globalization index (in addition to the political globalization index), but not for the social globalization index or any of its sub-indices. For non-OECD countries taken as a whole, our results match the full sample results, suggesting that non-OECD countries are not a "club" unto themselves. We also fail to find strong evidence to support regional convergence "clubs" within the non-OECD subsample for any dimensions of globalization considered.
Data
Our measure of globalization is based on the KOF index, which encompasses economic, social, and political dimensions of globalization. The index is described in Dreher et al. (2008a,b) . Drawing on the Economic globalization is comprised of two component sub-indices: actual flows of trade, FDI, investment, and income payments to foreign nationals; and policy restrictions on trade and capital flows measured by hidden import barriers, tariffs, taxes, and capital controls. The former represents "outcomes of the game" whereas the latter represents "rules of the game". The latter may therefore be one of many potential factors which directly influence the former. Social globalization is comprised of three subindices: personal contact representing international telephone traffic, transfers, international tourism, foreign population, and international letters; information flows captured by internet users, cable television subscribers, and newspapers; and cultural proximity for which the number of McDonald's restaurants, the number of Ikea stores, and trade in books are used as proxies. Each of these sub-indices captures alternative ways in which individuals may learn of ideas and customs from outside their domestic borders. The KOF index has provided a measure of globalization for numerous empirical studies. For example, higher KOF index values have been empirically linked to higher rates of economic growth (Dreher 2006) ; also to increased subjective evaluations of well-being (Hessami 2011 ) and life expectancies (Bergh and Nilsson 2010a) . While the KOF social globalization index, specifically, has been positively linked to income inequality, particularly in developing economies (Bergh and Nilsson, 2010b) , it has been negatively linked to gender inequality (Potrafke and Ursprung, 2012) . 5 Furthermore, higher KOF index values are associated with lower rates of inflation (Samimi et al., 2012) . 6 The KOF data set begins in 1970 but missing data is an issue, in particular for the earlier years.
We focus on a sample for which each country has complete time series for every sub-index. To limit the loss of countries, then, we begin the sample period in 1991. In addition to yielding a sample with substantially more countries than if we started earlier, 1991 also corresponds to the breakup of the Soviet Union into several independent countries. The breakup also resulted in substantially greater autonomy for the Soviet Union's erstwhile satellites. These newly independent and former satellite countries constitute a considerable part of our "Former Soviet Union & Central and Eastern Europe" regional subsample. Our Table 1 we report the mean values of each index for each year, 1991-2010, and in Table 2 we report the yearly means for the constituent sub-indices of economic and social globalization. In the course of our analysis below we also consider various subsamples of countries.
First, we consider OECD versus non-OECD. Second, from the latter we consider various regional subsamples. The countries constituting each of these subsamples are reported in Table 3.   7   5 Increased globalization has also been hypothesized to fiscally constraint governments by subjecting them to increased budgetary pressures from without. Dreher et al. (2008) report evidence based on the KOF index that fails to confirm this so-called disciplining hypothesis. Summary statistics for individual country overall, economic, political, and social globalization indices are provided in appendix Table A1 . Likewise, summary statistics for individual country economic and social globalization subindices are provided in appendix Table A2 .
Results
In this section we report the results of our analysis of the KOF indices. Specifically, we report evidence regarding the hypotheses of sigma convergence and cross-country stochastic convergence in the crosscountry data.
Sigma Convergence
Sigma convergence occurs when the dispersion in globalization index values falls over time. Due to the increasing levels of globalization documented in Figure 1 and Table 1 In Table 4 we report the results of several variants of the sigma convergence test. The specifications corresponding to the (numbered) table columns are:
(1)
Specifications (1)-(4) together cover a range of conceivable ways that a CV may exhibit a decreasing trend. Rows in Table 4 correspond to the KOF indices as well as the constituent sub-indices for the economic and social dimensions. We report the t-statistics associated with the null hypothesis that β 1 = 0, derived from HAC standard errors that are robust to serial correlation.
As it turns out, the evidence for sigma convergence is quite strong regardless of the particular specification. In each and every case (specification and index combination) the null hypothesis (which corresponds to no sigma convergence) is rejected with better than 99% confidence. Our conclusion is that the decline during 1991-2010 in the dispersion of globalization index values is statistically significant. This is true for the overall KOF globalization index; for the economic, social, and political globalization indices; also for the economic sub-indices (flows and restrictions) and social sub-indices (personal contact, information flows, and cultural proximity). Regarding sigma convergence, then, we conclude that globalization is occurring globally, and in a very comprehensive sense.
Stochastic Convergence
Our initial tests indicated strong evidence in support of sigma convergence. However, as argued by Carlino and Mills (1993) , a country cannot be said to be truly converging if it cannot return to its convergence path following a shock which temporarily pushes it off its previous stochastic path. In other words, such shocks cannot have permanent effects. In practice, this concept of stochastic convergence is tested by performing checks for stationarity of countries' relative positions; in this case, the log of the ratio of a country's globalization index value to the sample average for that year. The LLC test assumes a common unit root parameter (α). Thus the null of no unit root for any country is tested against the alternative that every country has a unit root. Alternatively, the IPS test allows for heterogeneity by simply pooling together individual country ADF tests. A separate regression of (5) is run for each country, i, resulting in a group of root estimates (
statistic is based on calculating the average of t-statistics associated with unit root null hypotheses across the N root estimates. Under IPS, the null of no unit roots is tested against the alternative that at least one country has a unit root. LLC may be more efficient because fewer parameters need to be estimated, but can also be misspecified if the assumption of parameter homogeneity is overly restrictive.
By construction, the IPS test may fail to reject the null due to one single country having a unit root when even all the remaining countries are converging. Further, Westerlund and Breitung (2009) demonstrate that LLC has greater local power than does IPS. Thus IPS may be prone to greater false
negatives. Yet, the potential misspecification from requiring a common unit root may lead LLC to false positive results. Because there is no clear choice, we interpret stochastic convergence to be supported only if the unit root null is rejected by both tests.
In columns (1) and (2) in Table 5 we present test statistics for the LLC and IPS panel unit root tests on the full samples of log relative globalization indices.
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Assuming a common unit root parameter, the LLC test rejects (at better than the 1% level) a unit root for each index and sub-index. , The IPS test, however, only rejects the unit root null for the political index (among the main indices). While IPS does not reject a unit root for the economic and social indices, it does reject (at the 1% level) for the economic flows and social cultural proximity sub-indices. Regarding the economic and social dimensions of globalization, then, stochastic convergence is only strongly supported for these latter sub-indices. We note, in particular, that there is not strong evidence (i.e., rejection of the nulls by both the LLC and IPS tests) of stochastic convergence in economic restrictions. Of the two KOF economic sub-indices, the restrictions sub-index is the one directly linked to institutional quality. In other words, we are unable to conclude that the institutional frameworks to facilitate international economic flows are stochastically converging. We find it interesting that, despite this, the actual international economic flows do seem to be converging. Thus, countries appear to be overcoming remaining differences in policy openness in the sense that their economies' shares of international goods and financial flows are still converging. We stress that the flows component represents shares rather than total trade and capital movements. Changes in trade policy would be expected to impact both the numerators and the denominators (GDP) of the share components. If restrictions hamper trade in general, then it could still be the case that greater restrictions imposed by the least open economies result in larger trade shares if trade restrictions were to slow the growth in overall GDP (by also hampering consumption and investment) at a greater rate than just for 8 For all our panel unit root tests we choose the number of lags, up to four maximum, which yields the smallest Modified Akaike value. LLC tests are estimated using Bartlett kernel with Newey-West bandwidth selection.
trade. Thus the share of GDP determined by trade could rise, implying convergence in trade flows on a relative (to GDP) scale, even when total trade is shrinking.
Although we are unable to conclude that stochastic convergence on the economic and social dimensions of globalization is occurring world-wide, convergence clubs may exist where groups of nations are converging among themselves. In the remaining columns (3)-(6) of Table 5 we report panel unit root tests when separating the sample into OECD versus non-OECD countries. For these tests, the world average t KOF in the IPS and LLC formulations now represents the sub-sample OECD or non-OECD average for that year.
Comparing across all columns, we see that the test results for the non-OECD sample match the interpretations from the World sample results. This is not too surprising given that the non-OECD sample is five times as large as the OECD sample. Differences are found, however, among the OECD subsample considered in isolation in columns (3) and (4). In particular, we find that OECD nations are forming a club in terms of overall globalization as well as for economic globalization. Convergence for political convergence is also strongly supported among the OECD nations but we do not interpret this as a "club" because we previously supported convergence among all nations in the full sample (columns (1) and (2)).
Finally, in Table 6 we further breakdown the non-OECD nations into potential regional clubs for the sub-indices (and overall index) where we failed to find strong evidence of convergence. The regions are classified as Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Latin America and Caribbean (LAC), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Asia and Pacific Rim (ASIA), and Former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe (FSUCEE).
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As before, the average (sub-)index value in each year used to determine convergence comparisons is computed separately for each region sub-sample. We do not find strong evidence consistent with convergence into regional globalization clubs. The IPS test fails to reject the unit root null for any of the globalization measures, and even the LLC tests fail to reject the null as often as they do reject the null, in each region except for LAC.
Country classifications are presented in Table 3 .
Conclusions
In this study, we test for convergence on globalization. Globalization is measured by indices representing economic, social, and political globalization. Based on a sample of 129 nations, we find an upward trend in the average level of each measure of globalization. We also find the global dispersion of each measure has been significantly declining over time supporting the notion of global convergence of globalization.
Panel unit root tests for stochastic convergence paint a less consistent picture. The full sample of nations is stochastically converging only for political globalization, and one individual sub-index on each of the economic, and social, dimensions of globalization. Some critics of globalization express concern that nations will lose their autonomy and cultural identities. Yet, while we find convergence on the political dimension (representing integration into multi-national organizations, treaties, and presence of embassies, etc.) and greater similarity in exposure to other cultures (through trade and capital flows, and the establishment of McDonald's and IKEAs) economic policies on trade and capital movement restrictions, and overall social globalization, are not converging.
We also find limited evidence of convergence clubs, except for an OECD club on the economic globalization dimension. There is not strong evidence to support non-OECD nations converging on any aspects of globalization that does not hold for the full world sample, and regional convergence among the non-OECD nations for any remaining globalization attributes appears weaker still. Thus, when globalization convergence is occurring, it appears to be global or not at all. As a result, with the exception of political globalization, the benefits from increased globalization would not be expected to be manifested equally across the globe. At least along the economic and social dimensions, globalization is less than fully global. .82*** Notes: *,**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Each regression also includes a constant term (not reported). Tstatistics are derived from HAC standard errors, bandwidth 2 (Bartlett kernel). .845*** Notes: *,**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Null hypothesis for all tests is a unit root (non-convergence). Bolded indicates both test-statistics consistent with convergence. N represents number of countries. 
